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Fighting terror with terror: 
chile’s tArgeting oF the mApuche
An arson attack on a home in Chile’s 
southern Araucanía region, allegedly 
carried out by members of the Mapuche 
tribe, has led to the reimplementation 
of a tough anti-terrorism law. After meet-
ing with his cabinet ministers following 
the attack, which took the lives of the 
homeowners, Chilean President Sebastián 
Piñera stated that the anti-terrorism law 
is the country’s best option to combat 
the attacks of the indigenous popula-
tion on local landowners. The aim of the 
law is to impose harsh penalties on domes-
tic terrorists, but leaders of the Mapuche 
tribe claim that the government is using 
the law to target their population in a 
discriminatory fashion.
The tension between the Mapuche and 
the Chilean government has continued to 
rise over the dispossession of land by state 
officials to expand the forestry industry, 
hydroelectric dams, and other corpora-
tions. The Mapuche tribe bases its claim 
to the territory on ancestral connections 
to the land. The Piñera administration has 
refused to expropriate land to the indig-
enous population, and some members of 
the tribe have resorted to targeting forestry 
companies through arson attacks, land 
occupations, seizures of timber stands, and 
roadblocks. In response to these tactics, 
the Chilean government imposed heavy 
punishments on the Mapuche population 
pursuant to the anti-terrorism law.
Law 18.314 was enacted in 1984 by 
the Pinochet regime to suppress domestic 
acts of terrorism and violent acts of armed 
political groups. The law defines illegal 
land occupation and attacks on equipment 
or personnel of multinational corporations 
as acts of terrorism that can be adjudicated 
in civilian and military trials. It also allows 
the state to rely on unidentified prosecu-
tion witnesses and indefinite detention for 
suspected terrorists, along with the power to 
tap telephones and intercept correspondence 
such as e-mails and other communications. 
The anti-terrorism law has been invoked 
on numerous occasions as a result of 
acts of arson in southern Chile, including 
incidents in 2002 and 2010.
The use of the anti-terrorism law has 
faced scrutiny for a number of reasons 
by the Mapuche tribe and international 
human rights groups, such as Minority 
Rights Group International and Human 
Rights Watch. The due process rights 
of Mapuche detainees have been threat-
ened by the measures allowed under the 
anti-terrorism law. Pre-trial detention is 
typically longer for a suspect under the 
anti-terrorism law than those charged with 
other crimes in Chile, and sometimes 
spans up until the beginning of trial. By 
allowing courts to hold Mapuche suspects 
in custody until trial under Law 18.314, 
Chile is violating Article 9, Section 3 of the 
United Nations International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
states, “It shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained 
in custody.” In Giménez v. Argentina, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) noted that holding 
a defendant in indefinite or prolonged 
pre-trial detention is a severe measure that 
should only be employed as punishment 
to those convicted of a crime or to repeat 
offenders.
The ability to use unidentified witnesses 
by the prosecution is a violation of Article 
14(3)(e) of the ICCPR which guarantees the 
right of defendants to confront witnesses. 
Under the anti-terrorism law, the prosecution 
is allowed to keep the identity of its wit-
nesses secret. The police tactics used in 
implementing the anti-terrorism law gave 
rise to many claims against the police 
force, but because the military tribunals 
maintain jurisdiction over all cases dealing 
with on-duty incidents, the Mapuche argue 
they have little chance of recovering dam-
ages. The IACHR has also rejected military 
tribunals as a way of trying civilians in its 
1998 Annual Report. The use of military 
tribunals in these cases is a violation of 
the Fair Trial Guarantees of Article 14 that 
Chile adhered to in its ratification of the 
ICCPR. Chile is also acting contrary to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
determination in Palamara-Iribarne v. 
Chile that military jurisdiction over civilian 
cases was inadequate to provide the basic 
right to a fair trial.
The Mapuche have continued to be 
inhibited by the Chilean state’s lack of 
recognition for their ancestral lands. As 
Mapuche and other indigenous communi-
ties take increasingly desperate measures 
to reclaim or maintain control over their 
territory, the Chilean government has con-
tinued to use the anti-terrorism law as 
a way to quell social movements in the 
Araucanía region. While the law aims to 
crack down on violence against landown-
ers in the region, Chile’s implementation 
of its anti-terrorism law has led to multiple 
violations of due process and human rights 
abuses against the Mapuche people. The 
Chilean government must address these 
issues if it plans to reach a successful 
agreement over the territorial disputes.
mAtch mAde in rubble? irAn And 
ArgentinA seek the truth in the AmiA 
bombing
Argentine and Iranian officials recently 
reached an agreement that will establish 
an international committee aimed at inves-
tigating the long-standing dispute over the 
deadly terrorist attack on the Asociación 
Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine 
Israeli Mutual Association, AMIA) build-
ing. The July 18, 1994, attack left 85 
people dead and hundreds more injured, 
constituting the deadliest bombing in 
Argentine history. The violence was aimed 
at members of the country’s Jewish popu-
lation, one of the largest in Latin America 
with nearly 200,000 Jewish citizens, and 
demands for justice were swift. Crippling 
inefficiency and allegations of cover-ups 
have hampered the investigation of the 
attack and complicated the identification 
of suspects.
As the search for culprits continued 
into 2006, Argentine prosecutor Alberto 
Nisman formally charged the Lebanon-
based Islamic militant group Hezbollah 
as the organization responsible for the 
attack and implicated the Iranian gov-
ernment as assisting in carrying out the 
attack. This came after Argentine intel-
ligence and the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
REGIoNS
118568_AU_HRB.indd   56 7/17/13   9:05 AM
57
Investigation identified Ibrahim Hussein 
Berro as the suicide bomber in the attack. 
His connections with Hezbollah, a Shi’ite 
political and militant organization, were 
also uncovered during the investigation. 
Although the prosecutor argued that Iran’s 
motive in supporting the attack was based 
on Argentina’s suspension of transfer-
ring technological information regarding 
nuclear material, Iran continuously denies 
any involvement in the AMIA bombing.
The Argentine government recently 
approved a memorandum of understanding 
with Iran to establish a truth commis-
sion for the AMIA bombing. President 
Cristina Kirchner announced that the two 
governments would establish an interna-
tional commission—with no Iranian or 
Argentine nationals as members—that will 
recommend a way to proceed with the 
investigation in Argentina as well as allow 
Argentine officials to investigate in Iran.
President of the Argentine Foreign 
Relations Committee Guillermo Carmona 
noted that the memorandum is the only way 
for Argentine legal officials to question 
Iranians such as Gen Vahidi, the current 
defense minister. The truth commission 
aims to reexamine evidence from the 
bombing to develop a due process model 
for the accused in Iran, while also allow-
ing Argentine investigators into Tehran 
to conduct interrogations. The Argentine 
government has continually experienced 
difficulties in extraditing Iranian suspects 
with Interpol warrants for their alleged 
involvement in the bombing.
The creation of the truth commission 
follows an emerging norm in the interna-
tional community of prosecuting massive 
and systematic human rights violations. 
As noted by UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment Juan 
E. Méndez, states have an obligation to 
respond to crimes against humanity, such 
as the bombing in Argentina. These obliga-
tions include investigating, prosecuting, 
and punishing perpetrators; disclosing to 
victims, their families and societies all 
information about the events; offering vic-
tims adequate reparations; and separating 
the known perpetrators from positions 
of authority. Argentina’s push for col-
laboration adheres to its responsibility of 
diligently meeting these four requirements 
of accountability.
Argentina also views the truth com-
mission as a way to ensure that individual 
rights are properly protected. By moving 
toward a new investigation, Argentina 
follows the four steps that Special 
Rapporteur Méndez highlights by seeking 
that justice is achieved for the victims, 
finding and disseminating the truth once 
the commission completes its work, 
and compensating the victims through 
monetary and non-monetary means.
AMIA and critics of the memorandum 
argue that Argentine judges can already 
travel to Iran to interview the suspects 
without an agreement. Jewish groups 
also argue that it is unconstitutional for 
President Kirchner to be involved in a 
judicial matter. Religious and social lead-
ers of the Argentine Jewish community 
have criticized the idea of allowing a truth 
commission created by Iran, which they 
suspect played a major role in the bomb-
ing, to develop recommendations for the 
domestic legal framework to follow. Critics 
note that allowing Iran to establish a truth 
commission undermines Argentine juris-
prudence if it finds that those charged with 
the crime are not required to be questioned 
or investigated by the international judges 
selected by the memorandum.
President Kirchner has argued that 
the agreement is the only way to gain 
needed access to Iranian officials. She has 
some support from groups like Amnesty 
International Argentina, which hailed the 
agreement as a way to move forward 
toward justice and reparations. However, 
members of the political opposition have 
asserted that the Iranian-created commission 
will function as a way to grant impunity 
to Iranian officials.
By attempting to work with Iran, 
Argentina seeks to meet its obligations of 
means and not results. Special Rapporteur 
Méndez explained that these obligations 
are subject to conditions of legitimacy in 
their performance, so even if the officials 
who are investigated are acquitted, as long 
as the judicial process was committed in 
good faith, then Argentine officials have 
met their obligation. This justice must 
coincide with not only the truth being 
presented to victims, but also effective 
measures to prosecute those responsible. 
Argentina’s shift toward the creation of an 
instrument of accountability moves them 
away from a “forgive and forget” mindset 
that has resulted in amnesty for violators of 
human rights that were found responsible 
for atrocities. The effectiveness of the truth 
commission will ultimately depend not 
only on its ability to find the truth, but to 
also use it to find justice.
Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Abuse in GuAtemAlAn PsychiAtric 
hosPitAl mAy Amount to torture
Psychiatric patients are often considered 
among the most vulnerable populations, 
largely as a result of a psychiatric patient’s 
powerlessness once placed under the con-
trol of another person. This vulnerability 
can be illustrated through a recent investi-
gation of a Guatemalan psychiatric facility 
that produced alarming results. Human 
rights groups—including Disability Rights 
International—conducted a month-long 
study of psychiatric hospital conditions 
across Latin America in November 2012. 
Conclusions indicated that, of a dozen 
hospitals examined, the Federico Mora 
Hospital in Guatemala City exhibited the 
most deplorable conditions. The Federico 
Mora Hospital is the only national, public 
psychiatric hospital in Guatemala. The 
investigation revealed incidents of severe 
neglect, abuse, and outright denial of medi-
cal treatment for many patients. Moreover, 
approximately 300 children were held in 
solitary confinement, a practice the inter-
national community condemns, especially 
when used for young children. Patients also 
reported incidents of sexual and physical 
abuse, identifying that the perpetrators 
include hospital staff and inmates from an 
adjacent prison. Although some hospital staff 
members are aware of the abuse committed 
against patients, the perpetuated climate of 
fear has resulted in unreported crimes that 
inevitably encourage further abuse.
The Guatemalan government ratified 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2009. Article 
15 of the CRPD provides that persons with 
disabilities shall not be subjected to torture 
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment. Furthermore, Article 16 
states that persons with disabilities shall 
be free from exploitation, violence, and 
abuse. As a State Party to the CRPD, 
the Guatemalan government’s adherence 
to both of these provisions is suspect, 
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especially in light of the reported grave 
conditions at Federico Mora hospital.
The Guatemalan government has 
also ratified the UN Convention Against 
Torture (CAT). The treaty enforcement 
body of the CAT, the UN Committee 
Against Torture, has established that “each 
State party should prohibit, prevent and 
redress torture and ill-treatment in all 
contexts of custody or control, for example, 
in prisons, hospitals, schools, [and] institu-
tions that engage in the care of children, 
the aged, the mentally ill or disabled.” The 
obligation to prevent torture extends to doc-
tors, health-care professionals, and social 
workers, including those working in private 
hospitals, detention centers, and other insti-
tutions. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment Juan E. Méndez, 
concluded in a recent report on abuses 
in health-care settings that “[m]edical 
care that causes severe suffering for no 
justifiable reason can be considered cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, and if there is State involvement and 
specific intent, it is torture.” Furthermore, 
the Special Rapporteur determined that 
prolonged seclusion may constitute torture 
and ill-treatment.
In response to the allegations of rampant 
human rights violations in Federico Mora 
Hospital, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR, Commission) 
requested precautionary measures for the 
patients of the Federico Mora hospital in 
November 2009. The Commission urged 
the Guatemalan government to take “[i]
mmediate preventive measures aimed at 
protecting all patients, particularly women 
and children, from physical, psychological 
and sexual violence by other inmates, 
guards and hospital staff.” Further, the 
Commission called on the government 
to relocate patients to community-based 
facilities in hopes that such facilities will 
respect disabled persons’ right to physical 
and mental integrity. Community-based 
alternatives also prevent segregation and 
exclusion from society, decreasing the 
likelihood of the vulnerability experienced 
in psychiatric hospitals like Federico Mora.
Dr. Miguel Alejandro De León, Federico 
Mora’s Head of Forensic Psychiatry, 
acknowledged some of the hospital’s prob-
lems, yet denied the extensive findings of 
the human rights groups. According to Dr. 
De León, a proposed solution is to create 
a separate facility for patients who have 
been criminally charged and who allegedly 
commit most of the abuses. However, 
such a solution inadequately addresses 
the deplorable conditions and practices 
employed by hospital staff.
As a State Party to both the CRPD and 
the CAT, the Guatemalan government is 
legally obligated to ensure the mental and 
physical integrity of all its citizens, includ-
ing the patients of Federico Mora Hospital. 
The Commission has requested that the 
government take several immediate steps 
to address the situation, including provid-
ing appropriate medical care, adopting 
measures to prevent abuse against patients, 
and separating children from adults. A 
failure to address known abuse and neglect 
may be further evidence of abuse that 
amounts to torture, thus placing the gov-
ernment at even greater risk of falling 
short of its international obligations.
Keystone XL PiPeLine Poses 
significant threat to heaLth of 
aLready VuLnerabLe communities
The proposed TransCanada Keystone 
XL Pipeline risks endangering U.S. fresh 
water sources and the public health of 
surrounding communities due to probable 
“dirty” oil spills and the environmental 
impacts of transporting oil that produces 
three to four more times greenhouse gas 
emissions than conventional oil. These 
adverse consequences will reportedly 
disproportionately affect the health and 
safety of minority and low-income com-
munities, including a predominately black 
and Latino neighborhood in Port Arthur, 
Texas. The pipeline will transport some 
of the dirtiest oil, linking tar sands oil of 
western Canada to refineries and ports 
in Texas along the Gulf Coast. Tar sands 
oil is highly acidic and corrosive and 
is considered the most toxic fossil fuel 
on the planet.
Indigenous people living in Fort 
Chipewyan in Northern Alberta, Canada, 
where tar sands oil is extracted, report the 
oil is linked to staggering hikes in cancer 
rates as a result of living downstream 
from tar sands production. In response 
to ongoing serious health concerns, Cora 
Voyageur, a sociology professor from the 
University of Calgary, recently launched 
an independent study to assess the health 
effects of these oil sands on nearby 
communities, including other health issues 
like autism.
The proposed Keystone XL Pipeline 
will cross key sources of drinking and 
agricultural water, including the Ogallala 
Aquifer that supplies fresh water for 
two million people in eight U.S. states. 
Environmental activists warn that the 
pipeline will pose a threat to the aquifer, 
which is considered one of the world’s 
largest underground sources of fresh water. 
Due to the close proximity of the pipeline 
with some parts of the aquifer, coupled 
with the high risks of oil spills, many are 
concerned about the likelihood of water 
contamination.
TransCanada’s first tar sands pipeline, 
Keystone I, commenced operations in 2010 
and experienced fourteen leaks within its 
first year. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. gov-
ernment issued a Corrective Action Order 
to temporarily shut down pipeline opera-
tions, finding that “the continued operation 
of the pipeline without corrective mea-
sures would be hazardous to life, property 
and the environment.” Although operations 
restarted, the pipeline has repeatedly been 
shut down due to the frequency of oil 
spills. Despite TransCanada’s projections 
of only five spills over a fifty-year span, as 
of October 2012, at least thirty-five spills 
have occurred. Thus, initial projections 
were grossly underestimated, a fact which 
increases concerns as the U.S. government 
considers approval of the XL pipeline.
The proposed pipeline is currently 
pending a federal permit from the U.S. 
Department of State (DOS). In March 2013, 
the DOS released a draft Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement for the 
proposed pipeline that, according to the 
Sierra Club, understates the adverse risks 
to Americans’ water and air, as well as 
the human health of nearby communities. 
Rather, the report focuses largely on pro-
spective job creation and American energy 
independence, minimizing potential 
adverse impacts the pipeline will have on 
the climate or the health of U.S. residents.
The International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) provides in 
Article 5(d)(iv) that a State Party must 
guarantee the right of everyone, without 
distinction as to race, color, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equal enjoyment to the 
right to public health. Both Canada and 
the United States have ratified the ICERD, 
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thereby obligating the countries to protect 
their citizens from significant public 
health risks. Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
also provides that “everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and his 
family.” Although the UDHR initially was 
not viewed as a legally binding document, 
it has gained an authoritative force encom-
passing international human rights norms. 
Moreover, in 2010, a resolution of the UN 
Human Rights Council (HRC) recognized 
the right to water and sanitation as legally 
binding for all Member States.
Despite growing concerns about pub-
lic health and safety, coupled with the 
poor track record of TransCanada’s first 
tar sands pipeline, the U.S. government 
continues to consider approving the 
pipeline. In light of the various negative 
impacts from construction, potential oil 
spills, climate change, and health risks, 
the government is legally obligated to 
ensure that all persons have access to clean 
and safe water and do not face adverse 
health conditions as a result of the project. 
Approval of the Keystone XL Project will 
likely jeopardize both the United States 
and Canada’s compliance with ICERD and 
the HRC’s resolution, posing a significant 
threat to some of America’s already vulner-
able communities. Health risks of nearby 
low-income neighborhoods heighten con-
cerns about the project’s disproportionate 
effect on minorities. Moreover, access 
to safe drinking water is further endan-
gered due to the environmental impacts of 
transporting dirty oil.
Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
AsiA And OceAniA
centrAl AsiA: BAlAncing nAtiOnAl 
security with FreedOm OF religiOn
Since September 11, 2001 all five 
Central Asian countries have enacted 
legislation restricting religious freedoms 
in an attempt to curb the rise of radical 
Islamic terrorism. The new laws have had 
a damaging effect on the free practice 
of religion. In 2004, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 
belief, Asma Jahangir, stated that freedom 
of religion “is a fundamental right that 
is not susceptible to derogation, even in 
time of emergency.” Despite a legitimate 
interest in promoting national security, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also main-
tain a set of obligations to protect this basic 
right as States Parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).
The threat of terrorism in Central Asia 
is well-founded. In 1999 and 2004 a series 
of bombings killed dozens in the Uzbek 
capital Tashkent. Immediately after the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, 
Tajikistan initiated a ban on certain groups, 
including Hizbut-Tahir, al-Qaeda, Bay-at, 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and 
Harakati Tablighot. In 2006, Kyrgyzstan 
labeled extremist group Hizbut-Tahrir 
as the largest religious challenge in the 
country. Kazakhstan has eliminated 42 
extremist groups and prevented 35 terrorist 
attacks since 2010 alone. However, many 
of the new Religion Laws have broad 
applications that affect religious activities 
with no relation to terrorism.
Kyrgyzstan’s Administrative Code and 
Turkmenistan’s Religious Organization 
Law require any religious organization 
operating within the state to register with 
the government. Kyrgyzstan also bans 
prayers and religious rituals not approved 
by the state. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan have made creating, promot-
ing, and distributing religious materials 
an offense subject to criminal penalties 
or high fines. The Administrative Code 
of Kyrgyzstan and the Criminal Code of 
Tajikistan make it an offense to participate 
in a religious organization that contradicts 
the aims of the state. And Tajikistan’s new 
Religion Law requires children to receive 
all religious education from state-licensed 
institutions. As previously reported in the 
Human Rights Brief, the Tajik government 
also enacted a Parental Responsibility Law 
that requires parents to prevent children 
from participating in religious activities 
that are not sanctioned by the state.
The effects of these laws have been 
present throughout Central Asia. According 
to a Human Rights Watch report, hundreds 
of religious organizations were forced to 
close in 2012 after failing to receive official 
registration from the Kazakh government. 
In the Kostanai Region of Kazakhstan, 
which has a population of 900,300, only 
two bookshops are allowed to sell religious 
materials. The report also indicated that 
during the same timeframe, over 200 
people in Uzbekistan were arrested or 
convicted for religious extremism. At the 
beginning of the year, 1,823 Tajiks began 
their studies in foreign religious institu-
tions; 1,621 were required to return to 
Tajikistan. The government of Kyrgyzstan 
is currently holding 83 religious extrem-
ists in detention facilities, amid fears that 
prisons have become breeding grounds for 
terror recruitment.
Because every country in Central Asia 
is a party to the ICCPR, each has an obli-
gation to promote the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion as outlined in 
Article 18. The rights include the “freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 
his choice, and freedom, either individu-
ally or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice 
and teaching.” The Central Asian coun-
tries claim they have not impinged upon 
these rights because Article 18 also allows 
for “such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others.” The General Assembly has 
affirmed that the Central Asian countries 
have read this exception for national secu-
rity too broadly. In Resolution 66/168, the 
General Assembly expressed concern with 
the growing number of restrictive laws and 
intolerance motivated by Islamophobia. 
The Special Rapporteur on the freedom of 
religion or belief then affirmed that “states 
should avoid equating certain religions 
with terrorism as this may have adverse 
consequences on the right to freedom 
of religion or belief of all members of 
the concerned religious communities 
or communities of belief.” Despite the 
sentiments by the General Assembly and 
Special Rapporteur, the Central Asian laws 
restricting the practice of religion have not 
been amended or repealed.
While the Central Asian countries may 
believe that the restrictions on religion 
are justified in the face of rising threats 
of terrorism, the ICCPR obliges member 
states to respect religion as a fundamental 
right. If the application of the Religion 
Laws continues to create a substantial 
burden on those not associated with terror-
ist activities, the United Nations, although 
it has not articulated further steps, could 
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begin to place more pressure on the Central 
Asian governments.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
South Korean Law May Be 
InfrIngIng upon the rIght  
to freedoM of expreSSIon  
on the Internet
South Korea, frequently considered 
a regional leader in human rights and 
democracy, and a State Party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), has come under 
recent UN scrutiny for its treatment of 
freedom of expression on the Internet. 
The ICCPR enumerates the universal 
right to freedom of expression in Article 
19, which protects the ability to “receive 
and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds” and limits this only with regard to 
protection of the rights of other individu-
als, national security, public order, public 
health, or morals. Similarly, the South 
Korean Constitution provides the right to 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association, but it limits these protections 
to the extent that they neither interfere 
with “honor or rights of other persons 
nor undermine public morals or social 
ethics.” However, reports indicate that this 
constitutional exception has been exploited 
to regulate discourse on the Internet.
In 2007, in an effort to allay mounting 
concerns over malicious and defamatory 
posts online, the government of South 
Korea instituted a real name identification 
system, which forced websites with the 
highest viewership to require all posters 
of online content to use their real name 
and risk prosecution. The South Korean 
Constitutional Court (Court) overturned 
the law in 2012.
Reports from watchdog groups defend-
ing media rights indicate that South 
Koreans continue to face pressure on their 
exercise of freedom of expression, even 
after the Court struck down the real name 
system. In 2008, after protests erupted 
when the government ended a five-year 
ban on U.S. beef imports, the govern-
ment responded by passing much broader 
legislation than the real name law: the 
Comprehensive Measures for Information 
Protection on the Internet. The law limits 
defamation, obscenity, and broadly defined 
threats to national security, and it forces 
website operators to remove any content if 
a third party claims it has been defamed, 
with sanctions for operators who do not 
immediately comply. The government also 
established the Korea Communications 
Standards Commission (KCSC) to help 
pursue these ends; the organization is 
empowered to monitor content on the 
Web, issue recommendations to remove 
defamatory content or content violative of 
public morals that may lead to fines in the 
case of noncompliance. Criticism of the 
KCSC is often focused on its lack of trans-
parency, broad-reaching powers, and the 
lack of reviewability. Furthermore, censored 
website operators or posters are generally not 
given the opportunity to defend their content. 
There are some indications that the mea-
sures are defended under the exceptions 
for government regulation in the national 
interest in both the Constitution and the 
ICCPR, as South Korea seeks to ensure 
public morality and social ethics.
The exceptions for national interest 
may not be broad enough to encompass 
South Korea’s regulation of expression. In 
the Constitutional Court opinion that over-
turned the real name identification system, 
the Court held that the law violated the 
South Korean Constitution, specifically 
with regard to citizens’ freedom of expres-
sion. The Court ruled that such restrictions 
are unjustifiable unless supported by clear 
public interests, applying constitutional 
principles that echo obligations under the 
ICCPR. The UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) clarified the ICCPR’s free-
dom of expression provisions in General 
Comment 10, which provided that the 
protection is not limited in regard to spe-
cific media—all media is protected. The 
UNHRC recently reaffirmed the impor-
tance of free expression on the Internet, 
citing it as a force for development and 
an integral, protected component of the 
already enumerated freedom of expres-
sion. The UNHRC further emphasized that 
all rights that are protected offline should 
be protected online.
Though the Constitutional Court struck 
down the real name identification law, 
reports indicate that South Korea may 
no longer be the beacon of free press in 
Asia that it was once considered. The 
Comprehensive Measures for Information 
Protection on the Internet law, coupled 
with the KCSC, continue to burden free 
expression. The UN Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, 
warned last year that defamation suits 
are being used to censor expression that 
informs the public interest. La Rue pointed 
out the structural burden on freedom of 
expression caused by these laws. To main-
tain its reputation for protecting human 
rights, South Korea could go far by heed-
ing the advice of La Rue and demonstrat-
ing commitment to freedom of expression 
on the Internet.
MongoLIa SeeKS to CapItaLIze  
on potentIaL for poverty 
reduCtIon through ItS huMan 
deveLopMent fund
When Mongolia transitioned from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market 
economy in the early 1990s, many of 
the country’s poorest were left without 
access to essential services, but the state 
is making a renewed effort to alleviate 
that disparity. As the state adapted to its 
new economic structure, the discovery 
of extensive mineral resources facilitated 
privatization and growth, and though much 
of the population benefited, many did not. 
Estimates place the value of Mongolia’s 
untapped resources as high as one trillion 
U.S. dollars, and the per capita gross 
domestic product tripled from 2004 to 
2010, but concern remains over whether 
these resources will benefit the poor, who 
make up roughly 35 percent of the overall 
population. Furthermore, watchdog groups 
like Freedom House have brought attention 
to corruption and lack of transparency 
in the awarding of lucrative mineral-
extraction contracts to foreign enterprises, 
which often limits the domestic impact of 
national resource wealth. To allay these 
fears, Mongolia’s parliament passed laws 
in 2008 aimed at wealth distribution. These 
laws, the National Development Strategy 
and the Human Development Fund 
(HDF), purported to make citizens eligible 
for access to the nation’s vast mineral 
wealth. The planned scope of HDF was 
immense; it was hoped that the fund would 
provide financial resources to pay for 
social services including pensions, health 
care, housing, and education, as well as 
provide cash payouts to citizens. Though 
data to quantify the early impact of the 
HDF is not yet readily available, distribu-
tion of funds recently became entangled in 
Mongolia’s electoral politicking.
Despite concerns over the implementa-
tion of the HDF, the program has potential 
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to have tremendous impact on Mongolia’s 
efforts to comply with its obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
to which Mongolia is a State Party. The 
program would align the state’s goals with 
objectives of the ICESCR insofar as the 
HDF would expand citizens’ access to 
national wealth and facilitate the protec-
tion of several ICESCR enumerated rights. 
The ICESCR obliges States Parties to 
recognize the rights to work (Article 
6), social security (Article 9), adequate 
standards of living and freedom from 
hunger (Article 11), and the highest attain-
able standards of health and accessible 
healthcare (Article 12).
Mongolia’s efforts to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
reflect the national need to address issues 
of poverty and poor health and education 
standards. The MDGs specifically focus 
on eradication of poverty and hunger, 
universalization of primary education, 
gender equality and participation, and 
several health-care-based initiatives. The 
report on implementation of the MDGs in 
Mongolia indicates a need to focus social 
services for the poorest and the historically 
marginalized. This imperative is echoed by 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, who asserted: “Mongolia 
has established a robust legal framework, 
recognizing that everyone must enjoy the 
rights to education, health, housing, food, 
etc. However, the laws do not necessarily 
translate into the everyday reality for many 
Mongolians.”
The government has plans to go beyond 
the HDF: draft versions of The Package 
Law on Social Welfare and The Mongolian 
Law on Employment Promotion were 
recently submitted to the country’s parlia-
ment. Each of the laws targets the most 
vulnerable groups and the poorest in 
an effort to extend the availability of 
social security programs and increase job 
creation. General Comment No. 18 to 
ICESCR, issued by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
explains that the right to work under 
Article 6 encompasses state programs 
supporting the availability of employment, 
the accessibility of the labor market to all, 
and the acceptability and quality of that 
employment.
It is unclear whether Mongolia’s 
efforts will be effective to meet national 
goals that align with the ICESCR and the 
MDGs. The government’s comprehensive 
attack on poverty is still young, but the 
apparent intent to distribute wealth and 
ensure the provision of social program-
ming could go far in aiding Mongolia’s 
poor. Haruhiko Kuroda, the President of 
the Asian Development Bank pointed to 
the proper management of the country’s 
mineral resources as integral to the coun-
try’s successful development, hinging this 
success on good governance and a policy 
of economic inclusion that trickles down 
to the poorest and sees benefits broadly 
distributed. Though Mongolia’s poverty 
rate continues to be high, commenters 
seem optimistic that, properly managed, 
Mongolia’s mineral wealth has the ability 
to elevate the country’s most need-stricken.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
Anti-Acid Violence legislAtion  
in PAkistAn not MitigAting 
growing occurrence of Acid 
AttAcks on woMen
Although recent legislation aims to 
reduce acid violence in Pakistan, acid 
attacks are on the rise. Acid violence—the 
throwing of corrosive acid on a person’s 
face or body—is an intentional act used as 
a form of violence against women, often 
in Pakistan, but it is also prevalent in other 
South Asian countries. The acid causes 
extreme damage to flesh and can even 
reach and harm the bone, permanently 
disfiguring victims of the attacks or even 
killing them. Since many cases of acid 
attacks go unreported, a true estimate 
of such attacks is difficult to determine. 
However, Pakistani non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) estimate the number 
to be 150-200 cases per year. In many situ-
ations, husbands, in-laws, or other family 
members throw acid on the (generally) 
female victim for revenge or because of a 
perceived wrongdoing on her part. Other 
reasons for targeting a woman are her 
refusal of a marriage proposal, rejection 
of a sexual advance, or for a dispute 
involving dowry or property. Acid attacks 
are an inexpensive method of violence, 
since bottles of corrosive acid are widely 
available for about twenty rupees, or less 
than fifty U.S. cents. Despite the passage 
of Pakistan’s Acid Control and Acid Crime 
Prevention Act, which brings the country 
in line with its international obligations to 
curb violence toward women, the Act has 
not produced desired conviction rates.
No explicit mention of acid attacks has 
been made in international law, but the 
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(Declaration) and the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), apply to 
acid attack cases and domestic violence. 
In a 2003 Resolution, the UN General 
Assembly further reaffirmed “the call for 
the elimination of violence against women 
and girls, especially all forms of . . . crimes 
committed in the name of passion . . . 
dowry-related violence and deaths, [and] 
acid attacks.”
The Declaration states that it serves to 
complement CEDAW, which, if effectively 
implemented could “contribute to the 
elimination of violence against women.” 
Article 1 of the Declaration defines violence 
against women as “any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in physical, sexual, or psychological 
harm or suffering to women.” Acid attacks 
fall under the category of gender-based 
violence because of the physical and 
psychological suffering women endure.
Pakistan acceded to CEDAW in 1996 
and Article 5 of the Convention calls for 
States Parties to “take all appropriate mea-
sures” to “modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view of achieving the elimination 
of prejudices . . . [and] practices which 
are based on the idea of inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes . . . .” 
Since acid violence perpetuates the idea of 
inferiority of women, Pakistan is obligated 
to take measures to counter such violence 
from continuing.
Pakistan did enact the Acid Control 
and Acid Crime Prevention Act in 2011 
that made significant changes to the coun-
try’s Penal Code, explicitly outlawing acid 
attacks and punishing perpetrators of acid 
violence. The Act expanded the definition 
to include “disfigures or defaces” in the 
original definition of “Whoever causes 
pain, harm, disease, infianity or injury to 
any person or impairs, disables, [disfig-
ures, or defaces] or dismembers any organ 
of the body or part thereof of any person 
without causing his death, is said to cause 
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hurt.” The Act adds two new sections into 
the Penal Code for Voluntarily causing hurt 
by dangerous means or substances, which 
states, “[W]hoever voluntarily causes hurt 
by means of . . . corrosive substance or 
acid…shall be called to have caused hurt 
by dangerous means or substances.” The 
other new section for the Punishment for 
causing hurt by dangerous means or sub-
stances punishes whomever intends to hurt 
or likely hurt any person “by dangerous 
means or substances . . . with imprison-
ment for a term which may extend to the 
whole of life, or with fine which may not 
be less than five hundred thousand rupees, 
or with both.” The Act also calls for the 
accused to pay for the loss of earning and 
medical expense of the victim and tackles 
the procurement of acid, only allowing 
licensed individuals to manufacture and 
sell acid.
Despite this law, an annual report 
published by the Aurat Foundation reported 
a 37.5% increase in acid attacks since 
2011, suggesting the ineffectiveness of 
this new act. One reason for the continued 
acid violence is the “very low conviction” 
rate because of “discriminatory societal 
attitudes.” Pakistan is obligated under 
CEDAW to eliminate these cultural notions 
that preserve violence toward women. The 
Progressive Women’s Association inves-
tigated only 600 cases out of the 9,000 
reports of acid violence from 1994 to 
2011. Of those 600 cases, only two percent 
of perpetrators were convicted. A low 
conviction rate suggests that the majority 
of acid attackers have been immune from 
punishment and have not yet been deterred 
from continuing acid violence.
Sri Lankan OfficiaLS have 
DiSmiSSeD aLLegatiOnS Of  
tOrture On Ltte DetaineeS
Four years after the end of Sri Lanka’s 
civil war, suspected members and sup-
porters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE)—the force opposing the 
Sri Lankan government during the armed 
conflict—are reportedly still subjected to 
various forms of torture, including physi-
cal and sexual violence, at the hands of 
government agents. Sri Lankan security 
forces continue to face allegations that 
they torture detainees in detention centers, 
prisons, police stations, or in unofficial 
facilities in order to coerce the LTTE mem-
bers and supporters into confessing to their 
participation. Torture is prohibited by the 
Sri Lankan Constitution as well as interna-
tional instruments to which Sri Lanka has 
acceded, such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT). Sri Lankan officials 
have so far dismissed the torture claims, 
thus preventing a serious investigation into 
these allegations.
The LTTE, a Tamil militant group, 
emerged in the 1980s in response to what 
they perceived as growing discrimination 
against the minority Tamil population in 
Sri Lanka. Desiring to separate from Sri 
Lanka, the Tamil militants often forcibly 
recruited members from the Tamil minority 
population to join in the efforts as soldiers 
or supporters. The Sri Lankan government 
defeated the LTTE in May 2009, but the 
war resulted in a high civilian death toll 
and detention for the LTTE members who 
were captured at the end.
Two reports, one from the NGO 
Freedom from Torture and another from 
Human Rights Watch, documented inci-
dents of torture against LTTE detainees. 
Many of these suspected LTTE members 
and supporters were arrested after the 
end of the war under authority granted 
by the country’s Prevention of Terrorism 
Act. Under Section 6 of the Act, senior 
police officers would have the authority 
to arrest, without a warrant, any individu-
als they reasonably suspected of offenses 
such as murder, kidnapping, robbery of 
public property, and firearm possession 
in security areas, among others. Since the 
law does not define reasonable suspicion, 
there is potential danger of arbitrary arrest 
of individuals. Many of those detained are 
placed in detention for up to six months 
without “effective due process”—the right 
to a fair trial and legal representation.
Once in this custody, Human Rights 
Watch reported that detainees are frequently 
victims of sexual violence, including the 
rape of both men and women, sexual 
assault, forced nudity, and sexual humilia-
tion. According to the report, the situation 
is more dire because the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act provides such deference to 
security forces that they are “effectively 
[immune]” from punishment for inflicting 
torture.
Echoing the language of Article 7 of 
the ICCPR—to which Sri Lanka acceded 
in 1980—Article 11 of the Sri Lankan 
Constitution calls for freedom from torture 
for all persons. Sexual violence and physi-
cal abuse reportedly committed by the 
Sri Lankan security forces toward LTTE 
detainees would constitute torture under 
Article 1 of the CAT—to which Sri Lanka 
acceded in 1994—which prohibits “any 
act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining … a confession.”
The torture reportedly inflicted on 
LTTE detainees also implicates domestic 
protections. Article 11 of the Sri Lankan 
Constitution forbids the use of torture or 
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” 
on any person. In a Sri Lankan Supreme 
Court case, Fernando v. Chrishantha, 
where the plaintiff was found to be tortured 
in a Sri Lankan prison, the court held that 
the prisoner’s “standing in the society” is 
not a consideration in determining whether 
his right to be free from torture under 
Article 11 of the Constitution was violated. 
However, Sri Lankan High Commissioner 
to New Delhi Prasad Kariyawasam, speak-
ing on behalf of the Sri Lankan government, 
did not accept the allegations of torture 
from Human Rights Watch as true, and 
said that there is a lack of evidence to 
substantiate said allegations. He stated 
that these allegations are most likely “sob 
stories for the sake of obtaining asylum 
or refugee status in a developed country.” 
This refusal to accept the validity of the 
allegations has prevented proper investiga-
tion into the detainees’ claims of torture. 
Without impartial investigation into these 
allegations, the detainees’ confessions are 
of questionable validity since it cannot be 
determined whether the evidence of their 
terrorist affiliation was forced by means 
of torture.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
centraL aSian StateS DiSregarD 
LgBt rightS
Throughout Central Asia, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people 
must hide their sexual orientation for fear 
of violence, extortion by the authorities, 
and even arrest. The lack of protections 
for this population creates a human rights 
issue. In the Soviet era, homosexuality 
was criminalized and could lead to several 
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years in prison. Since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation 
for LGBT people in Central Asia remains 
precarious, with homosexuality still crimi-
nalized in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
and discrimination and marginalization 
throughout the region. The Central Asian 
countries can come into line with interna-
tional law, enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and emerging norms by decrim-
inalizing homosexuality and combatting 
social norms stigmatizing people based on 
their sexual orientation.
Article 9 of the ICCPR defends against 
arbitrary arrest and protects everyone’s 
rights to liberty and security of person 
while Article 17 protects people from 
unlawful interference with privacy. Article 
26 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of the 
ICESCR both guarantee protection against 
discrimination on any grounds. In 2012, 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) explained 
that although the non-discrimination 
guarantees listed in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR do not explicitly include “sexual 
orientation,” they all include the words 
“other status.” The OHCHR explained that 
the inclusion of the words “other status” 
affirms that the lists of discriminations 
were intentionally left open to include 
future grounds for discrimination, such as 
sexual orientation, which were not consid-
ered when the documents were written.
In 2009, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
confirmed that the non-discrimination 
guarantee of the ICESCR includes sexual 
orientation. The CESCR explained that 
states should ensure that a person’s sexual 
orientation is not a barrier to realizing 
ICESCR rights. In June 2011, the Human 
Rights Council adopted the first UN reso-
lution on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, expressing “grave concern” at 
violence and discrimination against indi-
viduals based on their sexual orientation 
and gender identity, leading to the first UN 
report on this issue.
Discrimination against LGBT people 
is the prevailing standard throughout 
the Central Asian states. Article 120 of 
Uzbekistan’s criminal code outlaws sexual 
intercourse between two men, as does 
Article 135 of Turkmenistan’s criminal code. 
Since 1998, homosexuality is no longer 
outlawed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. Despite this legal change, the 
lack of specific protections for LGBT 
people and an environment where LGBT 
individuals cannot approach authorities 
for fear of blackmail or violence has led 
to societal discrimination, which func-
tions as if it is institutionalized by law. In 
Kyrgyzstan, lesbian and bisexual women 
are often subjected to forced marriages 
and rape in an effort to “cure” them. 
Homophobia is widespread in Tajikistan, 
where many view homosexuality as a sin 
or a disease and the general population 
is intolerant of homosexuality because 
of traditional attitudes and Islam’s 
strong influence on the population. This 
discrimination implicates the rights to 
privacy and expression because LGBT 
people are forced to hide their identities for 
fear of government and societal reprisal.
According to the organization Civil 
Rights Defenders, “[T]here are no legal 
safeguards against discrimination based 
on sexual orientation or gender identity 
in any of the Central Asian countries.” 
The organization also claims that human 
rights organizations in the region have 
been unwilling to defend LGBT rights 
and that if LGBT issues are addressed, it 
is usually in a manner that creates further 
stigmatization, such as in conjunction with 
HIV prevention initiatives. These initia-
tives, in and of themselves often carry their 
own cultural stigma, further marginalizing 
LGBT issues. In 2009, an Uzbek HIV 
rights activist was sentenced to seven years 
in prison for seducing minors; the court 
used the activist’s safe sex campaign as 
evidence that his activities contradicted 
the national traditions and culture of 
Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, however, there are initia-
tives and organizations working openly 
for LGBT rights and HIV prevention. As a 
marginalized population, LGBT people in 
Central Asia need government protections 
to ensure that they enjoy the rights offered 
to all persons under international law.
By arbitrarily arresting, blackmailing, 
criminalizing, physically and verbally 
abusing, and engaging in general discrimi-
nation against LGBT people, the Central 
Asian countries are not upholding the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR. These documents 
are both binding on the Central Asian 
countries because Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all 
States Parties. The only way for the Central 
Asian states to come into line with the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR is to decriminal-
ize homosexuality and to establish laws 
protecting their LGBT communities from 
discrimination. Even where homosexuality 
is decriminalized, societal discrimination 
and marginalization deprive LGBT people 
of their basic rights, which are guaranteed 
by the ICCPR and ICESCR.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
EuropE
Italy’s rEturn of asylum  
sEEkErs to GrEEcE raIsEs  
Human rIGHts concErns
The Italian government has recently 
instituted a policy of returning asylum-
seekers back to abusive conditions in 
Greece without reviewing their claims, 
an approach in conflict with both national 
and international obligations. Italy has 
continued to pursue this policy of sum-
mary return of both Greek asylum-seekers 
and persons from northern Africa who 
originally were seeking asylum in Greece 
despite requests from observers, includ-
ing Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on rights of 
migrants François Crépeau, that the state 
discontinue the practice. As immigration 
law is currently enforced, both adults and 
children are generally deported via com-
mercial ferries and confined in makeshift 
holding cells or engine rooms under the 
custody of the ship’s captain. According to 
media reports, asylum-seekers are some-
times denied adequate food and, upon 
return, Greece has been unable to provide 
the individuals with basic requirements of 
safety and shelter. This maltreatment is 
attributable to Greece’s overburdened asy-
lum system—a system which leaves little 
chance that asylum-seekers will receive 
adequate support within Greece and has 
led to numerous reports of human rights 
violations perpetrated by Greek authorities.
The Dublin Regulation (Dublin II), to 
which both nations are bound, governs 
the interaction between Italy and Greece 
regarding which state should process 
claims by asylum-seekers. The European 
Union (EU) regulation requires that 
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asylum claims be dealt with by the first 
Member State in which the asylum-seeker 
arrives. Should the individual leave that 
first state, the individual can be returned to 
the state of entry in the EU. The assump-
tion under Dublin II is that EU Member 
States will comply with their international 
obligations toward asylum-seekers under 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), the Qualification 
Directive, and the EU Charter. The stated 
goal of Dublin II is to ensure that one 
Member State is responsible for the exami-
nation of individual asylum claims in 
a manner that respects the fundamental 
rights of asylum-seekers. Additionally, it 
is meant to promote judicial efficiency of 
the asylum process and to deter individuals 
from filing multiple asylum claims. In 
practice, however, refugee rights advo-
cates note that Dublin II often acts as a 
roadblock to refugees by causing extensive 
delays in the examination of asylum claims 
by sending asylum-seekers back to their 
point of entry and increasing pressure on 
EU border countries that receive a dis-
proportionate number of asylum-seekers 
compared to northern European countries.
The use of Dublin II in relation to 
the Greece and Italy situation has drawn 
concern. In December 2009, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees recommended 
that governments stop sending asylum-
seekers back to Greece and stop applying 
Dublin II provisions until further notice, 
a request with which many nations com-
plied. In 2011, the European Court of 
Human Rights in M.S.S. v. Belgium & 
Greece held that Belgium had violated 
Articles 3 and 13 of the ECHR by send-
ing asylum-seekers back to Greece under 
Dublin II. Also in 2011, the EU Court 
of Justice held in NS v. ME that Member 
States have an obligation not to transfer 
asylum seekers to Member States where 
they would face inhuman or degrading 
treatment in violation of Article 4 of the 
EU Charter.
By returning asylum seekers to Greece 
without fully examining individual asylum 
requests, Italy has failed to address the 
concerns raised by the courts and intergov-
ernmental organizations. Further economic 
issues, especially in Greece but throughout 
Europe, continue to impede states’ abilities 
to provide integration services for migrants 
in the continent. Although movement has 
been made to standardize EU practices 
through implementation of a Common 
European Asylum System, as the states 
negotiate the asylum-seekers continue to 
face hardships.
Such hardships are not made easier 
by the economic hardship faced by the 
southern European countries that is exac-
erbated by their proximity to northern 
Africa, currently the source of a high 
number of asylum-seekers. Many such 
individuals enter via undocumented trans-
portation, making it exceedingly difficult 
to regulate the numbers of people entering 
the European countries. Without assis-
tance from northern European countries, 
it is difficult for the migrant-receiving 
countries in the south to process asy-
lum claims under Dublin II. In 2011, the 
Italian Minister of the Interior appealed 
explicitly for this kind of additional sup-
port from fellow European states. Italy 
may be violating its responsibilities under 
Dublin II and various human rights docu-
ments, but without support from other 
European states, Italy’s economic burdens 
make it difficult for them to meet these 
obligations. Nevertheless, continent-wide 
cooperation could create a viable path to 
adequately process asylum requests under 
Dublin II that respects the individuals 
seeking protection.
Belgium mulls Allowing  
Children to Choose deAth
Belgium is currently considering 
expanding a 2002 euthanasia law so that 
chronically ill children would be granted 
the right to choose to die. This proposed 
legislation has raised concerns from many 
groups about its implications on the qual-
ity of care available to children and the 
potential exploitation of chronically ill 
children for their organs. Current legisla-
tion allows adults over age eighteen to 
exercise the right to choose to die. The 
practice has been on the rise in Belgium; 
between 2011 and 2012, there was a 25 
percent increase in reported physician-
assisted deaths, accounting for two per-
cent of the total deaths in the country. 
Some doctors administering euthanasia 
procedures said they feel that part of caring 
for their patients is providing conditions in 
which a person can die with dignity. Before 
adults can access the right to die through 
euthanasia, they must show that they are suf-
fering from a “hopeless medical situation,” 
though this standard includes non-terminal 
conditions. Potentially extending the right 
to die to children has led critics to express 
a renewed sense of concern about the 
implications of such legislation.
Religious and anti-euthanasia advocacy 
groups point to a number of informed con-
sent issues arising out of the practice of child 
euthanasia. One particular area of concerns 
is the use of organ donation in cases where 
children, whose organs are in high demand, 
did not consent. More generally, a 2010 
report in the Canadian Medical Association 
Journal (CMAJ) revealed that nearly half of 
the interviewed Belgian nurses, who are not 
legally permitted to administer euthanasia 
drugs, admitted to participating in physician-
assisted deaths. Another study published in 
CMAJ found that nurses perform 32 percent 
of assisted deaths without an explicit request 
or consent, and 1.8 percent of cases classi-
fied as assisted death occurred without the 
consent of the patient. It also found that 
nearly half of physician-assisted suicides in 
the Flanders region were unreported, which 
hinders oversight.
Consistent with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, states codified and 
extended the rights of life, liberty, and secu-
rity of persons to children in Article 3 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), to which Belgium is a party. This 
article mandates that the “best interest of the 
child” should be the guiding principle for all 
matters concerning children. Additionally, 
Belgium faces certain obligations surround-
ing a child’s right to express her desires in 
relation to medical treatment. Article 12 of 
the CRC states that children must be allowed 
to express their views freely in accordance 
with their age and maturity. The article’s 
meaning is explained in the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child’s General Comment 
No. 12, which states that children must 
be allowed to express their views on their 
individual healthcare decisions. However, the 
Committee recognized that the child’s right 
to be heard must recognize the role a child’s 
maturity plays.
In the United Kingdom, a fourteen-
year-old girl stated that she did not want 
to continue with her life-saving cancer 
treatments, but later changed her mind 
and decided to undergo chemotherapy 
after receiving a text message from a 
friend. These apparently impulsive deci-
sions are what critics of the law wish 
to avoid. Conversely, many people argue 
that children with serious and incurable 
diseases should have the same rights as 
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adults to choose the appropriate form 
of treatment. Studies have shown that 
children often display greater lucidity than 
adults on the issue of death and often have 
skill, understanding, and maturity to make 
decisions about their personal medical 
situation. Parents of an eighteen-year-old 
who chose to exercise her right to die in 
the Netherlands said that their daughter’s 
decision allowed her to retain some dignity 
as her quality of life declined. Belgium 
faces the difficult task of balancing its 
obligations under the CRC to ensure that 
children’s voices are heard with its man-
date to protect the child’s best interest.
Belgium is not the only country pursu-
ing this type of legislation. A proposed law 
in the Netherlands would similarly expand 
euthanasia to children. As a child’s right 
to choose to die gains legislative ground, 
protection from potential abuses of eutha-
nasia will become particularly relevant for 
suffering children, one of the continent’s 
most fragile groups. Because children are 
not always able to speak for themselves, 
the CRC requires that children’s rights be 
viewed through a different framework than 
that used for comparable rights afforded 
to adults. Consequently, simply expanding 
the current Belgian legislation to children 
may not take into account the complexi-
ties and vulnerabilities of youth. With 
the proper safeguards in place, Belgium 
may be able to successfully implement its 
proposed legislation and provide children 
with appropriate autonomy in decisions 
involving the right to choose to die.
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
Middle east and north africa
state sovereignty or  
deMocracy: Which Will  
Win in iran’s election?
After widespread protests following 
the disputed 2009 election results, the 
ruling elite led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
have chosen to ensure a consolidation of 
power before the June 2013 election. In 
August 2012, the UN Secretary-General 
expressed deep concern about “reports 
of the increasing number of . . . arbitrary 
arrest and detention, unfair trials, torture 
and ill treatment; and the severe restric-
tions targeting media professionals, human 
rights defenders, lawyers and opposition 
activists.” Since the release of the Secretary-
General’s report, the arbitrary arrests have 
increased, creating an urgent need for Iran 
to comply with its binding obligations under 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICCPR grants all peoples the ability 
to freely determine their political status, 
the right to hold opinions without interfer-
ence, and the right to self-determination. 
In February, UN Special Rapporteur on the 
rights and freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association, Maina Kiai, publi-
cally reminded Iran of its obligations to 
protect civil liberties. In early 2012, Iran’s 
Guardian Council disqualified more than 
2,000 potential candidates for the parliamen-
tary election, citing a lack of adherence to 
Islam and the Constitution. No opposition 
parties or candidates have been allowed to 
propose alternative presidential candidates. 
Iran also appears to be increasing its media 
censorship by criminalizing any action that 
purports to organize a protest, expresses a 
“disturbing political opinion,” or insults 
the presidential candidates. In January 
2011, the Iranian government created the 
Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) to secure 
the country from cyber crimes. In recent 
months, FATA has been monitoring online 
bloggers, activists, and citizen groups that 
are critical of President Ahmadinejad. 
Many fear that as the election nears, FATA 
may attempt to block campaign blogs and 
social networking sites that rally sup-
port for opposition leaders, repeating the 
government blockade of websites in 2009. 
These actions would stand in direct conflict 
with Iran’s obligations under Article 19 of 
the ICCPR, which provides that “everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds.”
The ICCPR also obligates States 
Parties, including Iran, which ratified 
the Covenant in 1975, to protect against 
arbitrary arrests and ensure fair trials. In 
2011, former presidential candidates Mir 
Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, 
and Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard, 
were placed under house arrest and banned 
from participating in parliamentary elec-
tions. The Iranian government condemned 
these opposition leaders for inciting the 
2009 riots. Because formal charges were 
never filed, the United Nations Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention condemned 
the arrests in 2012. In February 2013, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, Ahmed 
Shaheed, called for the immediate release 
of hundreds of Iranian political prisoners, 
including Mousavi and Karroubi, who 
remain under house arrest.
Shaheed’s requests came on the heels of 
a wave of arbitrary arrests and harassment 
of political activists, human rights law-
yers, and media workers. A report by the 
Committee to Protect Journalists indicated 
that Iran is a close second for having the 
highest number of journalists imprisoned. 
In January, security forces arrested sixteen 
journalists in a single week. A recent Human 
Rights Watch Report documents the mass 
exodus of Iranian lawyers and activists to 
neighboring Iraq and Turkey. The report 
indicates that the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees received 11,537 asylum 
applications in 2009; 15,185 in 2010; and 
18,128 in 2011. In response to Shaheed’s 
call for the end of arbitrary imprisonment, 
the Iranian government labeled the scrutiny 
of Iran by the UN Special Rapporteurs as 
an attempt at political sabotage. As one 
of only a handful of countries with a UN 
Special Rapporteur assigned to it, Iran feels 
that it has been unjustly singled out. Yet, the 
Iranian government has repeatedly ignored 
its obligations under the ICCPR to ensure 
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention.” As the election nears, 
the international community will be ana-
lyzing Iran’s compliance with its ICCPR 
obligations. Specifically, it will scrutinize 
Iran’s commitment to ensure a free election 
by universal suffrage, “held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the electors.”
Since this analysis was written in April 
2013, the Iranian elections took place with 
relatively few security incidents and the 
victory of a moderate candidate, Hassan 
Rouhani. The ruling clerics, under Ayatollah 
Khamenei's leadership, sucessfully adverted 
a repeat of the 2009 widespread protests by 
continuing the house arrest of reformist 
leaders, intimidation activists, and stifling 
journalists. Iran's obligation to uphold the 
rule of law and protect basic freedoms 
continues far beyond the comparatively quit 
election period.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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The PlighT of Syrian refugeeS in 
lebanon
Almost one million Syrian citizens 
have fled their country since peaceful 
protests, beginning in March 2011, trans-
formed into a violent civil war. Fighting 
between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and 
opposition militias has ravaged cities and 
towns throughout Syria. Lebanon, which 
has an official policy of dissociation with 
the Syrian conflict to prevent hostilities 
from spilling over the border, is absorbing 
a large portion of the Syrian refugees 
who are fleeing the war-torn country. As 
of May 2013, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimates that the number of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon exceeds 430,000. 
The country of four million, however, 
is not legally obligated to care for the 
refugees because it is not a party to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Refugee Convention). Due 
to the large influx of refugees into the 
tiny country, Lebanon is faced with a 
predicament seen in many conflicts that 
international law provides an insufficient 
framework for solving.
According to the Statute of the Office 
of the UNHCR, which was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, all govern-
ments should cooperate with the High 
Commissioner in the performance of 
his functions. Article 23 of the Refugee 
Convention promises refugees the same 
treatment, with respect to public relief and 
assistance, as is accorded to a country’s 
own citizens. Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
enshrines the right of persons to enjoy 
asylum from persecution in other coun-
tries. However, this framework may not be 
enough to safeguard the rights of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon.
Syrian refugees in Lebanon that have 
yet to register with the UNHCR cannot 
receive necessities such as food, blan-
kets, and rental assistance. In a February 
interview with National Public Radio, the 
UNHCR representative in Lebanon said 
that the agency simply cannot keep up with 
the growing number of refugees—4,200 
people per day currently approaching the 
agency, as compared to 1,700 people per 
day in December 2012. Aid workers have 
indicated that the registration process is 
hindering refugees from receiving neces-
sary aid in a timely manner.
Lebanon absorbed over 400,000 
Palestinian refugees since 1948, many of 
whom are still living in refugee camps run 
by the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA). Because of this history, 
Lebanon has forbidden the construction of 
formal refugee camps for Syrian refugees. 
The UNHCR says that Lebanon does not 
have the legal or administrative procedures 
in place to address the specific needs of 
refugees, leaving them vulnerable to arrest, 
detention, and deportation. The agency 
notes that improving protections for refu-
gees in Lebanon is a priority and that it is 
working toward a more stable understand-
ing with the Lebanese government.
Lebanon’s fragile political balance 
and its history with Palestinian refugees 
certainly provide reason for caution, but 
these are not an excuse to escape the steps 
that need to be taken. According to the 
UNHCR Syria Regional Response Plan, 
refugees are scattered across Lebanon in 
over 540 locations, in some of the poorest 
areas of the country, because Lebanon has 
not established refugee camps. Without 
centralized locations for refugees to live, 
they are forced to find shelter throughout 
Lebanese communities, making aid more 
difficult to distribute.
The UNHCR emphasizes that burden-
sharing is key to maintaining the protection 
of refugees. In furtherance of this theory, 
the UNHCR assists refugees so that the 
cost of their welcome is not borne by 
the countries of refuge alone. Turkey and 
Egypt are the only countries, of the five 
formally accepting Syrian refugees, that 
are bound by the Refugee Convention. 
They are better equipped to deal with the 
refugee situation because they are bound 
by international law to provide additional 
protections. If Lebanon were a party to 
the Convention, the refugees would be 
afforded automatic protections, such as the 
right to receive identification documents 
and the right not to be deported back to 
Syria.
The UNHCR Statute, the Refugee 
Convention, and the UDHR all highlight 
the rights that should be afforded to 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Improving 
the situation for these refugees falls on the 
UNHCR, the Lebanese government, and 
other developed countries to provide suf-
ficient aid. Without binding international 
guidance, Syrian refugees depend on the 
good will of the international community 
for survival. The UNHCR can be better 
prepared to deal with the influx of refugees 
in Lebanon by making the registration 
process more efficient and reinforcing 
the staff and resources available for reg-
istering refugees. Since the key players 
dealing with this refugee situation lack 
necessary resources and there is an insuf-
ficient binding legal structure, it remains 
an insurmountable challenge to provide the 
Syrian refugees with their UDHR rights to 
asylum and for them to be treated equal to 
Lebanon’s own citizens.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Sub-Saharan africa
SuPPreSSion of civil SocieTy 
raiSeS concern over Zimbabwe’S 
conSTiTuTional referendum
Zimbabwe’s constitutional referendum 
may signal a new future for Zimbabwean 
governance and human rights, but arrests 
and raids of several human rights organiza-
tions have cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
the process. The constitutional referendum 
was passed with 94.5 percent of the vote, 
and political elections are scheduled for 
the summer. The motivation for the reform 
traces back to the country’s 2008 elec-
tions and the power-sharing agreement 
between the political parties of President 
Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister 
Morgan Tsvangirai. Observers questioned 
the validity of the elections, which were 
colored by allegations of vote suppression 
and fraud. Tsvangirai’s party narrowly won 
a majority in parliament, and his assertion 
that Mugabe could not remain president 
without a majority in parliament led to 
an extensive power-sharing agreement 
under which Mugabe became president 
and Tsvangirai became Prime Minister. 
Events leading up to the referendum 
vote, however, indicated a suppression 
of the involvement of the Zimbabwean 
people, instead of the empowerment that 
the power-sharing agreement purports to 
reinforce.
Article VI of the power-sharing agreement 
established the constitutional referendum 
and acknowledged the “fundamental right 
and duty of the Zimbabwean people to 
make a constitution by themselves and for 
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themselves.” In referencing the referendum 
before the UN General Assembly in 2009, 
Mugabe expressed his “unwavering com-
mitment to chart a new vision for the 
country and to improve the lives of the 
people in peace and harmony.”
However, the government engaged 
in arrests of members of civil society 
throughout the reform process and such 
efforts increased in the months leading up 
to the vote. In August 2012, Zimbabwean 
riot police described by witnesses as 
“visibly drunk” raided the headquarters of 
the Gay and Lesbian Alliance of Zimbabwe 
(GALZ). Employees stated that they were 
assaulted as the officers seized documents 
based on charges of running an “unregis-
tered organization,” an allegation also used 
to authorize the arrest of the director of the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. 
Authorities have also apprehended several 
members of the Counseling Service Unit 
(CSU), a torture and political violence 
support organization, for possession of 
“offensive and subversive material.”
The weeks leading up to the vote have 
been particularly intense for what activists 
call suppression of civil society. Police 
officers on February 11 twice raided the 
offices of the Zimbabwean Police Project, 
which has been a target of antagonism dat-
ing back to the arrest and alleged torture 
of its director in 2008. On the recent 
occasion, officers entered the offices both 
times brandishing warrants for “subversive 
material.” On February 13, when the date 
for the referendum was announced, eight 
members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise 
(WOZA) were arrested following what 
reports have described as police beatings 
and tear gas deployment against activists 
handing out roses and teddy bears during a 
Valentine’s Day demonstration outside the 
Zimbabwean Parliament.
Civil society organizations’ activities 
related to voting in the referendum have 
also led to raids on several organizations 
and arrests on charges of voter registration 
fraud. ZimRights, a human rights organi-
zation, has seen its director and secretary, 
among other employees, arrested for “voter 
registration fraud.” Officials charged the 
employees with “publishing falsehoods, 
fraud and forgery after . . . conducting ille-
gal voter registration.” Similarly, following 
an initial arrest of forty members, officials 
charged two leaders of the National Youth 
Development Trust with voter registration 
fraud for possessing voter registration 
receipts. This has also extended to the 
arrest of two officials from the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Support Network for holding an 
“unsanctioned public meeting.”
Targeting civil society with violence 
and arrest based on political activity are 
violations not only of the professed purpose 
of the constitutional referendum, but also 
with the inclusion of state authorities in the 
reported situations, the actions implicate 
Zimbabwe’s obligations under international 
human rights law. The charges and the 
circumstances of the arrests are indicative 
of arbitrary arrest due to their broad nature 
and also suggest a pattern of suppres-
sion based on political activities without 
cause, in violation of Article 9 of both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the binding International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which Zimbabwe is a State 
Party. The police actions, which the civil 
society organizations have said was aimed 
at suppression of information, targeted 
the dissolution of the organizations and 
seizure of documents and publications. 
This implicates ICCPR obligations under 
Articles 19 and 21, which protect the rights 
of freedom of association, expression 
through the dissemination of opinion and 
information, and assembly, and constitutes 
political discrimination contrary to Article 
1 of the same.
In a process aimed at increasing peace, 
democratization, and broader political 
involvement, Zimbabwe’s laudable goal of 
a constitutional referendum has resulted 
in increased suppression of civil society. 
These allegations of human rights viola-
tions by Zimbabwean authorities put into 
question the legitimacy of the constitu-
tional referendum and whether this alone 
could solve the institutional defects that 
lead to rights violations in Zimbabwe.
ElEction REfoRm ShiftS 2013 VotE 
in KEnya fRom 2008 ViolEncE
Kenyan voters returned to the polls on 
March 4, 2013, for the country’s first gen-
eral election since a 2008 vote marred by 
widespread political violence and claims 
of voter fraud and rigged tabulations. Since 
that election, Kenya revised its constitution 
in 2010 and this was the first test of its 
provisions intended as a response to the 
aforementioned electoral violence.
Kenyans voted for the new constitution 
in a referendum following a power-sharing 
agreement between now outgoing presi-
dent Mwai Kibaki and career politician 
Raila Odinga. In an effort to end post-
election violence, Kofi Annan brokered 
the agreement, which saw Odinga assum-
ing the position of prime minister while 
Kibaki retained the presidency.
Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru 
Kenyatta—the ultimate winner of the 2013 
vote—is alleged to have had control over 
the attacks against Odinga’s political sup-
porters during the violence that followed 
the 2008 election. Kenyatta is one of the 
wealthiest men in Kenya, and was charged 
in the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
with financing and directing murder, 
forced deportation, sexual violence, 
and other inhumane acts—charges that the 
pre-trial chamber confirmed in January 
2012. Kenyan politics centers around 
ethnicities and ethnic alliances, and 
violence was directed at opposing ethnic 
groups primarily between Kibaki’s Kikuyu 
supporters—of which Kenyatta is also a 
member—and Odinga’s Luo supporters.
With this history, one primary domestic 
and international concern leading up to the 
March vote was the validity of the election 
results. To this end, the constitution created 
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC). The IEBC oversaw 
the entire electoral process, and adjudi-
cated any claims of voter fraud. In this 
endeavor, the IEBC primarily was tasked 
with enforcing regulations of Electoral Act 
of 2011. The IEBC decisions and petitions 
are then subject to judicial review in the 
Supreme Court of Kenya.
The 2013 vote pronounced Kenyatta 
the victor with 50.07 percent of the vote to 
Odinga’s 43.7 percent. This result avoided 
an automatic recount that would be trig-
gered if no candidate received a majority. 
Due to the close nature of this result, 
however, Odinga and civil society allies 
challenged the election results, asserting 
that they were again marred by techni-
cal problems. The IEBC did direct some 
recounts in areas that had been affected 
by technical issues; however, these small-
scale recounts did not change the initial 
results and the IEBC certified the election 
on March 9; on March 31 the Supreme 
Court upheld the election results.
While some observers have questioned 
the IEBC recount process, the functioning 
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of the 2013 election and post-election 
stands in stark contrast to what occurred 
in 2008. On Election Day, there were a 
few instances of violence and clashes with 
police in Mombasa. The attacks, however, 
were perpetrated by a separatist organiza-
tion—in contrast to the 2008 violence, 
which was politically motivated targeting 
ethnic groups. The 2013 elections also 
saw a concerted effort by Kenyan police 
and security forces to increase security 
presence at polling stations and in possible 
areas of violence. Likewise, no widespread 
violence broke out post-election.
Yet the result of the election drew 
international attention because it resulted 
in victory for a president who is indicted 
on charges of international crimes. This 
places him in the exclusive company of 
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan as ICC-indicted 
heads of state. In fact, much of Kenyatta’s 
campaign addressed this indictment, and 
he rallied support around claims that it was 
part of western control of Kenya. While 
this has raised some issues around foreign 
assistance and diplomatic ties, much of 
the possible outcomes will rest on ICC 
decisions and possible trials later this year.
While Kenya’s election still revolved 
around ethnic identity and alliances with 
the candidates, it did mark a turning point 
in a country struggling for political legiti-
macy following the 2008 election violence. 
Although the issue of a major western ally 
having an ICC-indicted head of state has 
yet to be resolved, the functioning of the 
election was for the most part violence-
free. The election reaffirmed human rights 
obligations of Kenya in both preventing 
violence and elections. Kenya fulfilled its 
duties to protect citizens from violence 
under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) Articles 3 and 5. This 
allowed for Kenya to maintain its citizens’ 
rights to universal suffrage and having a 
voice in governance under UDHR Article 
21(1) and (3).
Tyler Addison, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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